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Resumen: En su libro Time Reborn y en otros escritos, el físico Lee Smo-
lin identifica a Peirce como precursor de su idea de que las leyes naturales 
evolucionaron; una visión que va en contra de la opinión común dentro 
de la física de que el tiempo no es real. Después de discutir los argumentos 
de Smolin sobre la realidad del tiempo, se discuten también dos plan-
teamientos defendidos por Smolin –la selección natural cosmológica y la 
Quantum Energetic Causal Set Theory– en el contexto de la cosmología 
de Peirce. Se muestra que el enfoque de Peirce proporciona una posible 
base para una teoría física como la Quantum Energetic Causal Set Theory, 
abriendo el camino para una cosmología completa que haga justicia a la 
física contemporánea.
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Abstract: In Time Reborn and elsewhere physicist Lee Smolin identifies 
Peirce as a precursor to his view that natural laws evolved, a view that runs 
counter the received opinion within physics that time isn’t real. After dis-
cussing Smolin’s arguments for the reality of time, two approaches advo-
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cated by Smolin –cosmological natural selection and Quantum Energetic 
Causal Set Theory– are discussed in the context of Peirce’s cosmology. It 
is shown that Peirce’s approach provides a possible ground for a physical 
theory like Quantum Energetic Causal Set Theory, opening the way for a 
full-fledged cosmology that does justice to contemporary physics.
Keywords: Smolin, cosmology, space, time.
§1. IntroductIon
Opinions on Peirce’s cosmology are widely divergent1. W.B. Gallie famously 
termed it the white elephant of his philosophy (a description Murray Murphey 
later called charitable2), and to Christine Ladd Franklin it showed that her former 
logic teacher had gone off the deep end.3 The contrary view is found as well. Situ-
ating Peirce’s cosmology papers in “the radical fringe,” Paul Forman observes that 
it would take physicists another quarter century to catch up and seriously consider 
the idea that all regularity in nature is statistical.4 Vincent Potter goes even fur-
ther, stating that Peirce’s claim that there is real chance in the universe, “led him 
in fact to anticipate quantum theory.”5 My sympathy lays with the latter group, 
and in this paper I will examine the work of a contemporary physicist, Lee Smo-
lin, whose cosmological views exhibit a close kinship to Peirce’s, and see whether 
Peirce’s work in cosmology has still something to offer to cosmologists today.
Like Peirce, Smolin is both physicist and philosopher, albeit that whereas 
Peirce was primarily a philosopher, Smolin is first and foremost a physicist. There 
is also much affinity between the two. Smolin’s The Trouble with Physics (2006) is 
remarkably Peircean in spirit, even though there is no indication in the book that 
at the time Smolin had even heard of Peirce.6 A few years later, however, in Time 
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Charles S. Peirce 2014 Centennial Congress. 
Lowell, Mass., July 16-19, 2014. The author wants to thank Lee Smolin for his valuable criticism at 
that event.
2 Cfr. Gallie (1952: 215), and Murphey (1965).
3 Cfr. Ladd-Franklin (1916: 720f.).
4 Cfr. Forman (2011: 152-53). 
5 Cfr. Potter (1996: 139).
6 Cfr. Smolin (2006). 
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Reborn (2013), Smolin explicitly identifies Peirce as the first to argue that natu-
ral laws are not eternal, as is typically assumed, but evolve over time, a position 
Smolin also argues for7 In what follows I take a closer look at Smolin’s approach, 
especially his work in Quantum Energetic Causal Set Theory, by comparing and 
contrasting it with Peirce’s and see whether there are elements in Peirce that 
could be helpful in developing this approach further.
§2. the nature of cosmology
For the purpose of this paper, I take cosmology to mean the study of the 
origin, evolution, and eventual fate of the entire universe.8 As such, cosmology 
is to be distinguished from theories that study particular phenomena within the 
universe, and the question naturally arises whether theories developed for the 
latter purpose can be applied equally to the universe as a whole. Smolin denies 
that they can, and he accuses those who do of committing what he calls a cosmo-
logical fallacy. Take Newtonian mechanics, which originated as the study of the 
motions of physical objects. Newtonian mechanics works by singling out a few 
salient aspects, while ignoring everything else. For instance, when studying the 
movement of cannon balls, the theory focuses on things like the angle of the bar-
rel, weight of the projectile, and amount of gunpowder used, and then explores 
what happens when you vary these elements while assuming that nothing else in 
the universe affects it or is affected by it, including the clocks and the rulers we 
use in our measurements. In Smolin’s words: “we isolate and study a few degrees 
of freedom [while] ignoring the rest of the universe” (Smolin, 2014: 108). The 
latter he calls the background. Though in all strictness the assumption that we 
can ignore all else is wrong, he continues, in practice it works amazingly well: It 
leads to approximate but effective theories that give us general laws that can be 
applied to a great variety of specific conditions. In fact, Newtonian mechanics 
7 Cfr. Smolin (2014: xxv) [Spin Networks, 2013]), p. xxv. The same observations return in Mang-
abeira Unger & Smolin, (2014: 367) and Mangabeira Unger & Smolin (2014: 417).
8 Smolin and Cortês also call it fundamental cosmology to distinguish it from the study of large 
subsystems of the universe, which also goes by the name of cosmology. Cfr. Cortês & Smolin (2015: 
note 1).
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was deemed so successful that it caused Laplace to conjecture that a sufficiently 
powerful intelligence knowledgeable of the current state of the universe could 
derive its entire past and future (Laplace, 1951: 4). Now even if this were true 
and such a Laplacean demon could retrace the past back to its point of origin, 
what we eventually would arrive at is a set of initial conditions and a set of laws. 
What such a demon would not be able to answer, Smolin correctly observes, 
are the following two questions: “Why did the universe start from these initial 
conditions, rather than different ones?” and “Why is it governed by these laws, 
rather than different ones?”9 In Smolin’s view these are two questions that any 
cosmology must be able to answer, especially since on both counts the possibili-
ties are endless. It is here too that Peirce comes in. In the first of his Monist papers 
Peirce writes, “To suppose universal laws of nature capable of being apprehended 
by the mind and yet having no reason for their special forms, but standing in-
explicable and irrational, is hardly a justifiable position.”10 Uniformities like the 
laws of physics, Peirce continues, “are precisely the sort of facts that need to be 
accounted for” (W 8.101). Without a cosmology, physics as a science is horribly 
incomplete, no matter how successful it is within its limited domain.
A historically popular answer –and one that long satisfied us– is that the laws 
of physics originated with God, the rational creator of the universe. Today this 
answer does not come as naturally as it once did, and both Peirce and Smolin re-
ject it, opting instead for a naturalistic and evolutionary answer11 (W 8.01) This 
brings in the notion of time.
§3. the realIty of tIme
If laws do evolve, time must be real, because to evolve means to change over 
time. In line with this, Smolin spends considerable effort arguing for the reality 
9 In Newtonian physics laws are justified, either by being abstracted from experience or by being 
successfully applied, but they are not explained–no reason is given, or sought, why they are so and not 
otherwise.
10 Cfr. Peirce Edition Project (1981-, vol. 8: 101) (the Writings are further referred to as W [vol#].
[pg#]).
11 A more extensive account for why Peirce holds that the explanation of laws has to be an evolu-
tionary one is found in e.g. Cornelis de Waal, 2013.
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of time. This raises a few questions: “Why do physicists deny that time is real?” 
“What does it mean for time to be real?” and, “What is time?” Let’s start with the 
last question. To the scientifically inclined mind, time, like space, is an organiz-
ing principle of experience, and one that is reasonably captured by defining it as 
“irreversible sequence.”12 This definition captures in relatively simple terms the 
common sense notion that what has happened, happened –that one cannot go 
back or, so to speak, turn back the clock. Consequently, we can say that processes 
take place in time, or are “timed,” when they cannot be reversed. Now it seems 
that many processes can be reversed. For instance, I can put a coffee cup on my 
desk and pick it up again. Physicists who deny that time is real will argue that 
all natural processes are in essence like this: they can be reversed, even if only in 
principle, and if this happens it is like playing a movie backwards. 
In response to physicists who argue that everything that happens in nature is 
reversible, one can say that even something as simple as setting a coffee cup on a 
desk is not truly a reversible process. What enables us to say that it is that we are 
artificially isolating some aspects while assuming that the rest of the universe says 
put. Though typically this assumption is justified when we confine ourselves to 
such isolated domains –if only because at a practical level it gives us answers that 
we can work with– this does not warrant us to blindly apply it to the universe as 
a whole. In other words, whether time is reversible or not must be established at 
the cosmological level, not derived from some artificially delineated subdomain 
of it. To do otherwise is to commit what Smolin calls the cosmological fallacy.
There is another reason why physicists deny that time is real. Especially fol-
lowing Newton, physics has come to rely extensively on mathematics, and as 
Smolin also shows (and he is hardly the first to do so), the mathematics used is 
ill equipped to deal with time. Let’s return to the example we looked at earlier. 
When we have readied our cannon, we can calculate how the projectile will 
travel and where it will land. In fact, we can draw a curve on a sheet of paper, 
the familiar parabola, where distance is a given as a function of time. However, 
in doing so something strange happens –something Smolin calls “the expulsion 
of time.” The curve presents the entire trajectory at once, thus transforming what 
appears like a motion through time into a timeless object –a line on a sheet of 
12 For Peirce’s notion of time, cfr. e.g. (W 8.130-134). Whereas for Causal Set Theory time is 
discrete at the Planck scale, Peirce insists that it is infinitely divisible (W 8.130).
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paper. Its truth or falsity is timeless too. And, last but not least, the geometry 
of the curve beckons reversibility. To put it concisely, time is spatialized. Time 
thus becomes an added spatial dimension: rather than having three directions 
of freedom –right/left, back/forth, up/down– we now have four directions of 
freedom, and this fourth direction–past/future–is presumed to behave in exactly 
the same way as the first three. At this point physicists are tempted into another 
fallacy, that of confusing our mathematical representation of nature with na-
ture itself and declaring the former “reality as it truly is.” We could call this the 
representational fallacy –the confusion of ones object of study with a particular 
representation of it.13 However, that geometry cannot represent time without 
spatializing it may say more about geometry as a medium of representation than 
about the object it seeks to represent.14 This becomes especially clear when we 
compare the geometer with, say, the novelist. The novelist encounters the exact 
opposite problem. She cannot describe space, albeit a landscape or a bedroom, 
without temporalizing it –one sentence after another. We can also point at the 
painter whose medium forces him to depict depth by flattening it. In all these 
cases it is the medium that is being used that is a cause of distortion. In sum, the 
expulsion of time in physics is the combined effect of two fallacies that tend to 
reinforce one another: the cosmological fallacy and the representational fallacy.
This brings us to the third question: what meaning can be given to the claim 
that time is real? The distinction that is being drawn here is between what is real 
and what is an illusion and only has the appearance of being real. The prevalent 
view in physics today is that space is real and time is not. Smolin, reverses this, 
arguing that time is real and space is not (Smolin, 2014: 172)15. Smolin, following 
familiar usage in physics, argues that something is not real when it is a so-called 
emergent property. An example of an emergent property is temperature as it is 
conceived in thermodynamics, where it is a rough but useful way for describing 
13 This fallacy is nothing new. René Bergson and Alfred N. Whitehead already identified this it. 
Cfr. Bergson (1999: 34). Bergson called it the mistake of confusing partial notations for real parts. For 
Whitehead, cfr. Whitehead (1925: 51). Whitehead termed it the fallacy of misplaced concreteness–
treating an ideal or abstract object, which is essentially a product of thought, as if it concretely exists. 
14 The spatialization of time is closely related to the measurement of time: We “measure” time by 
pairing a physical event with devices that capture some regular (often periodic) movement in space, 
whether it be a sundial, pendulum clock, clepsydra, or atomic clock.
15 A more technical account is found in Cortês & Smolin (2015).
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the state of a large number of particles, even though the description does not 
apply to any of the particles themselves. Now if particle physics were to provide 
us with a fundamental description of the universe in terms of particles in motion, 
temperature does not enter into such a description, and ipso facto is not real.16 Re-
ality is here conceived as the ontological commitment minimally required by our 
most basic theory of the universe. Smolin argues that an argument like that for 
temperature can be given for space, but not for time. Time, for Smolin, is not an 
emergent property, but a necessary part of any theory about the universe. Whereas 
one can, in principle, give an adequate account of the universe without making 
any reference to the concept of temperature, or to the concept of space, one can-
not, so the argument goes, give an adequate account of the universe without in-
troducing the notion of time –that is, without introducing irreversible sequence.
§4. temporal naturalIsm and evolutIonary laws
When we draw together the various aspects discussed so far, what we get is 
a call for a temporal naturalism. Cosmological theories need to acknowledge 
the reality of time and they should be naturalistic. We are to study the world 
we encounter on its own terms, meaning that it is to provide us both with the 
phenomena to study and with the means for evaluating them.17 And since it is 
cosmological theories we are discussing, such a temporal naturalism should be 
able to provide us with answers to the two questions Smolin asked: “Why did 
the universe start from these initial conditions, rather than different ones?” and 
“Why is it governed by these laws, rather than different ones?”
Smolin’s naturalist requirement not only precludes the assumption of a su-
pernatural being; it also precludes us from boldly positing an n-dimensional 
multiverse in which our four-dimensional universe is presumed to be but one 
of countless non-interacting multidimensional objects.18 Both approaches have 
16 Note that this is a far more restrictive conception of what is real than Peirce’s. On Peirce’s con-
ception of reality, cfr e.g. de Waal (1996). 
17 For Smolin’s definition of naturalism, cfr. Smolin (2013).
18 More broadly, it precludes the Platonism popular among physicists as a way of explaining the 
success and timelessness of mathematics. Cfr. e.g. Smolin (2015).
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been used, and are still being used, to answer Smolin’s two questions. The for-
mer seeks to answer them in terms of a Divine Creator; the latter by means of 
probability theory.
In the 1870s Peirce argued against the application of probability theory to the 
universe as a whole, remarking not without sarcasm: “Universes are not as plen-
tiful as blackberries” (Peirce, 2014:141; W 3.266. The multiverse theory found 
a way around this. By making universes even more plentiful than blackberries, it 
allows for a statistical argument to account for the initial conditions and natural 
laws of our universe. As Smolin correctly observes, however, such an explanation 
of our universe is non-falsifiable and falls beyond the scope of science. To put it 
in Peirce’s terms, it fails the pragmatic maxim. For Peirce, the epistemic content 
of any conception (including hypotheses) is strictly limited to “[the] effects, that 
might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our concep-
tion to have” (Peirce, 2014: 90; W 3.300). For the multiverse hypothesis there 
are no such effects (in fact, they are excluded a priori), making the hypothesis not 
just unfalsifiable, but literally meaningless. It is also a form of cheating, one very 
much like the invocation of God, as our universe is here again subsumed under 
some grander scheme, the entirely entire universe, one that has its own laws and 
initial conditions that still need to be explained.19
As far as Smolin’s account of evolutionary laws goes, he seems to move in two, 
possibly complementary directions: cosmological natural selection and quantum 
energetic causal set theory. “The basic hypothesis of cosmological natural se-
lection,” Smolin explains, “is that universes reproduce by the creation of new 
universes inside black holes” (Smolin, 2014: 124)20 This makes the formation of 
universes a natural process that, at least conceivably, can be empirically verified, 
or falsified, by studying our universe, something that is not possible with the 
multiverse theory described earlier.21 I see, though, a different problem with this 
theory, as it puts multiple universes within the same causal chain. If our universe 
19 Though it may be perhaps true that a divine being created the universe, claiming that it is so 
utterly fails as an explanation, and it does so for very much the same reasons as why the multiverse the-
ory fails. The latter is not to deny that a Peircean view precludes the possibility of multiple universes.
20 Cfr. also Smolin (1992).
21 In contrast to the multiverse hypothesis, the black hole theory passes the pragmatic maxim, as it 
has conceivable practical effects that could be brought to light by future research.
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sprouts forth from another universe, our universe is again no longer the entire 
universe, but is merely a sub-region within a larger whole. Should this hypothesis 
be true, the universe is once again proven to be a lot larger than we thought it 
to be. This larger whole comes with its own laws, such as a cosmic law of natural 
selection, as well as something to which those laws are being applied. So here too 
there seems to be an element of cheating. We are no longer giving a theory of the 
entire universe, but we only seek to explain that subsection that we happen to live 
in.22 In short, it seems that cosmological natural selection too cannot account 
of the cosmos as a whole but is in the end a local theory, not unlike Newtonian 
mechanics, and to imagine otherwise is to once again fall victim to the cosmo-
logical fallacy.
I think that the prospects are far better for Smolin’s second approach: quan-
tum energetic causal set theory; a view he developed with Marina Cortês23. It is 
to this that we turn next.
§5. Quantum energetIc causal set theory
The quantum energetic causal set theory (QECST) developed by Smolin and 
Cortês is part of a group of theories that fall under the umbrella of Causal Set 
Theory (CST). Partially motivated by the goal of unifying quantum theory and 
general relativity theory, CST seeks to describe the structure of space-time at 
the smallest, or quantum, scale. It proposes that the universe at its most basic 
level can be defined as a causal set –a finite set of identifiable “events” that stand 
in a partial order relation– and then aims to show how a smooth homologous 
4-dimensional space-time manifold can be explained in terms of it. Very brief-
ly, space-time emerges as a uniform sprinkling with Planck density of discrete 
elements. This allows us to say that at the macro level we could maintain that 
22 This is not to imply that the theory is false, only that if it were true it would only show that that 
the universe as we know it is not the entire universe, just as in the past we discovered that our galaxy 
is not the entire universe. Hence, cosmological natural selection, though it would provide an explana-
tion for the origin of our universe would not provide an explanation for the origin of the universe (it 
is cosmology, but not fundamental cosmology; see note 8 above.
23 See esp. Cortês & Smolin (2015: 4), and Cortês & Smolin (2015). 
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space-time is continuous, even though at the micro level (at a scale of about 10–20 
times the size of a proton) it is discrete. To present an analogy: space-time relates 
to causal sets in very much the same way as the temperature of a gas relates to 
the kinetic energy of its particles. Space, time, and temperature are all emergent 
properties. 
There are various arguments within physics for favoring CST’s discrete ap-
proach to the prevailing continuity-grounded approach with its heavy reliance 
on differentiable space-time24. For the purpose of this paper, I will take such 
arguments for granted and take an optimistic attitude toward CST’s future as 
a theory in physics. Instead, I will sketch the main elements of both CST and 
QECST with the aim of drawing a connection with Peirce’s evolutionary cos-
mology to explore the possibility of a Peircean contribution in this area that goes 
beyond a quick reference to a few sentences of his “The Architecture of Theo-
ries,” as is done by Smolin.
The core of CST consists of a causal set (or causet): a (finite) set of elements 
combined with a partial order relation (or porelation). To minimize conceptual 
contamination, a minimal interpretation is given to these elements and to this 
partial order relation.25 CST is not entirely successful at this, as it refers to the 
elements as events and to the partial order relation as causal. Moreover, already 
by applying set theory and combinatorics, these events are presumed to be dis-
crete, hence identifiable, or labelable, meaning that they can be paired with, say, 
(a subset of ) the natural numbers. As far as CST goes, this seems permissible, 
as CST explicitly seeks to inquire whether a discrete basis can be given to space-
time, but, as we will see, it is unlikely to be a permissible presupposition when 
our aim is, as it was Peirce’s, to provide a cosmology that seeks to give an account 
of how the universe could have emerged.
A partially ordered set, P, is a set with an order relation p that is:
(1) reflexive: ∀p ε P, p p p
(2) anti-symmetric: ∀p, q ε P, if p p q, then q p p iff p = q;
(3) transitive: ∀p, q, r ε P, if p p q p r, then p p r.
24 A helpful overview is found in Bombelli (1983: c. 1).
25 Bombelli (1983: 26) speaks of “a new substance, which does not have any precise correspon-
dence with any large-scale concept”. However, what may be really called for is a rethinking of the 
notion of substance, rather than calling the substance “new.”
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CST adds to this a fourth condition, namely that the number of events lying 
between any two fixed events is always finite; put differently, any two related 
are connected through a chain with a finite number of links. These links can 
be defined in terms of nearest neighbor: p and q are nearest neighbors iff p p q 
and there is no r (distinct from p and q) such that p p q p r. The model thus 
developed can be used to construe so called Hasse diagrams where events are 
represented by points, and relations between them by lines. The chains that are 
formed in this manner must not be interpreted as “in” space, or as “in” time, but 
space and time must be interpreted as emergent properties over the causal set 
as here defined. For instance, considering time, we can say that in p p q p r, p 
belongs to the past of r, and q belongs to its future, without this commiting us 
to hold that somehow the chain as a whole takes place in time. By making the 
past inacccessible, the anti-symmetry requirement of the porelation occasions 
the directionality of time. As the above account suggests, the mathematics of 
choice for CST is combinatorics, including graph theory, rather than (differen-
tial) geometry.
QECST differs from CST in that certain intrinsic qualities are assigned to the 
events, namely energy and momentum, which are propagated along causal links 
and are conserved at each event (i.e., conservation laws apply to them). In “The 
Universe as a Process of Unique Events,” Cortês and Smolin (2015:3f.) present 
their model in terms of four principles:
•	 “Time is a fundamental quality [through] which new events are created 
out of present events. Causality results directly from the irreversible agency 
of time.”
•	 “The future develops out of the present constantly; there are no causal 
loops and no regions or phenomena where time ‘evolves backwards.’”
•	 “The space-time properties of an object or event arise from its relationship 
with other objects or events.” Assuming Leibniz’s principle of indisern-
ables, this implies that “each [object or] event in cosmological evolution 
[is] unique and distinguishable from all others” by its causal past.
•	 “Energy is fundamental. Energy and momentum are not emergent from 
space-time [but] space-time is emergent from a more fundamental causal 
and dynamical regime in which energy and momentum are primitives.”
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Though QECST declares time to be more fundamental than causality, where-
as CST takes causality to be more fundamental than time, this seems mostly a 
squabble over very vague and tentatively conceived concepts that were frank-
ly admitted to lack any precise correspondence with how they are defined and 
used in macroscopic physics (Bombelli, 1983: 26). The main difference between 
QECST and CST is the fourth principle where QECST introduces energy and 
momentum as primitives (i.e., non-emergent properties). 
Because each event is unique (principle C), there can be no exact repetition 
–all repetition is approximate and the result of seeing only part of the story– and 
this affects how we can conceptualize the laws of physics. For QECST the causal 
structure and the momenta provide a complete description of the world, and the 
dynamics of the system is a product of the agency of time operating under three 
sets of constraints (the conservation laws being one of them). Space is an emer-
gent property that functions “as an arena for a statistical description of the fun-
damental processes” (Cortês & Smolin, 2015: 5). The concept of space makes it 
possible “to conceive of a law or a rule for generating unique events when that 
rule had to be simple, [while] what distinguishes the events in a big universe are 
the intricacies of their histories” (Cortês & Smolin, 2015: 8) This explains Smo-
lin’s view that space isn’t real but merely conceptual shorthand that enables us 
to apply simple, general laws to a vast complex of unique events. These discrete 
events must not be confused with elementary particles. Only when the system is 
“dominated by persistent repeated patterns” do we encounter what Smolin and 
Cortês call quasi-particles, and it is only with quasi-particles that we can have 
reversible processes –i.e., time symmetric dynamics. Moreover, the emergence of 
regularity is associated with “the loss of novelty in the system [which] at some 
stage stops being sufficient to destabilize regularity” (Cortês & Smolin, 2015: 
19). In general, what computer simulations based on this model have shown is 
that “irreversible dynamics seems to have the tendency to evolve towards predict-
able, reversible evolution” (Cortês & Smolin, 2015: 19).
Though QECST may fare better than CST in deriving a space-time congru-
ent with current physical theories about macroscopic physical processes –which, 
incidentally, includes the behavior of things as small as protons– it comes at a 
significant cost from a fundamental cosmology perspective as it involves a signif-
icant increase in terms of ontological commitments.
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Now, neither CST nor QECST provides a full-fledged cosmological theory. 
Its purpose is rather to show that space-time is an emergent quality and that 
there is a more fundamental level at which physical processes can be described 
without having to invoke space. For QECST, apart from what must be called 
a rather mysterious “agency of time,” there is a preset ontology of events (with 
each event intrinsically endowed with energy/momentum), and there are three 
very specific constraints set on the formation of new events. For a cosmological 
theory that leaves quite a bit unexplained. One could try to make QECST into a 
cosmological theory by combining it with Smolin’s theory of cosmological natu-
ral selection. In that case one could just say that when our universe burst fourth 
from a black hole, it propelled itself through this “agency of time” as a shower of 
discrete events that became more and more regular over time. But as I indicated 
before, this would not count as a proper cosmology. Just as a Newtonian cosmol-
ogy is an uncritical extension of Newtonian mechanics to the entire universe, so 
the theory of cosmological natural selection appears an uncritical extension of 
the (biological) law of natural selection, this time not merely to the entire uni-
verse, but even squarely beyond it. 
Earlier we asked whether Peirce’s evolutionary cosmology has anything of val-
ue to offer to contemporary physics, something that extends beyond the oblig-
atory historical footnote. This question can now be recast as follows: Has Peirce 
anything of value to offer to CST or QECST? I think he does, so let’s have a brief 
look at his evolutionary cosmology.
§6. peIrce’s evolutIonary cosmology
For Peirce, the universe did not develop within a multiverse, from a black 
hole, or out of a pre-existing causal set, but it developed literally out of nothing. 
To make sense of this, we need to take a brief look at Peirce’s theory of the cat-
egories. According to Peirce, all we can possibly think of, whether it is a tooth-
ache, a mathematical theorem, or the universe, exhibits three indecomposable 
characteristics, which he calls firstness, secondness, and thirdness. Though he 
gives various formulations for them, in essence they come down to the follow-
ing: Firstness is “that which is such as it is, positively and without reference to 
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anything else”26; secondness “that which is such as it is, with respect to a second 
but regardless of any third” (CP 8.328); and thirdness “that which is such as it 
is, in bringing a second and third into relation to each other” (CP 8.328) Peirce 
uses a mathematical argument to show that these three categories are irreducible, 
to establish their hierarchy, and to show that they are exhaustive (there is no 
fourthness etc.). Finally, he gives convincing empirical evidence that these three 
categories are present in all that we can experience or think of.27
To say that the universe emerged out of nothing means that it originated out 
of a state entirely free of constraints –a state of pure possibility. What happens 
in a state like this? With nothing to stop it, something is likely going to happen, 
and this something is what it is, positively and without reference to anything 
else, if only because there is nothing else that it can be in reference to. In brief, 
nothing is bound to give rise to something. Taking this route requires us to be 
more explicit about what we mean by the term “nothing.” One could conceive 
of “nothing” as what is left behind after everything is removed. This doesn’t seem 
to be a particularly good way of going about it, though, as this gives us rather an 
empty something.28 It is the kind of argument that has led us to the notion of 
empty space, of which Newton’s notion of absolute space in the Scholium to the 
Principia is perhaps the clearest example. The “removal method” also results in a 
conception of nothing that is entirely passive.
Furthermore, from a cosmological standpoint, such a post-universe concep-
tion of nothing is acceptable only if we assume that the creation and subsequent 
annihilation of the universe leaves not a single trace behind (i.e., space is invari-
ant with respect to the creation and annihilation of a universe), which is a very 
strong assumption with which to begin ones cosmology. 
Alternatively, one could conceive “nothing” in terms of oppositions that can-
cel each other out. For example, when your assets equal your debts, you find 
26 Hartshorne, Weiss, & Burks (1931-1958, vol. 8: paragraph 328). Subsequently referred as CP 
[vol.#].[paragraph#]. 
27 For a more developed account, see de Waal (1996: sect. 3.2).
28 This way of conceiving nothing takes its cues from operations such as emptying a dishwasher 
or cleaning out a closet. However, when the closet is emptied what is left isn’t nothing, but an empty 
closet–and removing the closet is a very different kind of operation compared to merely emptying 
it. Similarly, the “removal of empty space” is a very different kind of operation than removing things 
from space.
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yourself in a situation where you have nothing. Though this way one might 
avoid a commitment to the notion of empty space, it is hard to deny that what 
we effectively end up with is a conception that is the product of a juxtaposition 
of opposites–namely, that juxtaposition where they cancel each other out–which 
is still something. To truly have nothing, is to have neither assets nor debts (nor 
anything else for that matter). Hence, as with the former situation, we have not 
properly succeeded in conceptualizing “nothing.”
A far leaner approach is to simply maintain that if there is truly nothing 
–meaning there are no constraints whatsoever– there is nothing to prevent any-
thing from happening, so that eventually something will happen, which, as there 
are no constraints, will be a purely random event. In other words, all we are 
doing is to remove the restriction that came with the concept of nothing as it 
was conceptualized through the removal of everything, which is that it has to be 
purely passive –something like an inert, empty space at t
0
– unable to generate 
anything. Such active, or energetic, interpretation of nothing dovetails nicely 
with the remarks by Peirce that drew Smolin’s attention, namely that a purely 
random event is not the kind of thing that needs further explanation to justify 
belief in its possibility, as any explanation to that effect will give us a narrative 
that de facto negates the event’s randomness. It also dovetails with the idea of 
Smolin and Cortês, discussed earlier, that the events CST speaks of are intrinsi-
cally endowed with energy and momentum.
To the above account it could be objected that in all strictness it cannot be 
put that way because such a “first” would already stand in some kind of relation 
(namely, that of emergence) to the nothing that it emerged from, and to which 
it would be second. Put briefly, already in the emergence of a first, all three 
categories are present, so that it would not truly be a first as defined by Peirce. 
This agrees with Peirce’s notion, already referred to, that one cannot think of 
anything at all without all three categories being invoked. What this objection 
reveals, is that in contemplating the origin of the universe we are truly roaming 
at the border of what is conceivable, a problem that we also encountered in the 
attempts by CST to conceptualize its main ingredients: events, and the relations 
that are taken to hold between them. Two options quickly present themselves. 
We could conceive of this nothing as pre-first –as whatever can give rise to a 
first. Or we could identify this nothing itself as first, to which whatever that is 
to emerge from it would be a second that stands to it in a relation of random 
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emergence (which brings in a third). Since nothing can be conceptualized as 
what it is, positively and without reference to anything else (Peirce’s definition 
of a first, see above) the second option seems the cleanest. This means that, from 
a cosmologist’s perspective we have to say: first there was nothing. This first sets 
some limits, because whatever is to come next can no longer be first, but has to 
be second to it, and in virtue of that some relation between the two is introduced 
as well –that is, a third. Any such relation is at once a limitation. Building on 
this, Peirce argues that the original state of pure possibility is continuously reined 
in, allowing some things to emerge, while precluding others.
At this point we are at great risk of ascribing all sorts of thing-like properties 
to what is said to emerge out of nothing. It is, for instance, tempting to say that 
at this point things “come into existence.” To say so, however, would not only be 
premature but also wrong as existence entails standing out and interacting with 
other things like it in a persistent manner, and that requires a relatively high level 
of regularity that is clearly absent at this level. In fact, because of this regularity 
requirement, in its early stage not even the universe itself can be said to exist. 
For the same reason, there are no laws in the early universe. It is only in virtue 
of a high-level restriction of possibility that laws can emerge by enabling certain 
paths while precluding others. The laws of physics thus develop not unlike the 
manner in which a stream wears its own bed (CP 5.492); they have the character 
of deeply engrained habits, leaving the possibility, as with any other habit, that 
they could be broken assuming the circumstances allow it. As Peirce puts it in 
“The Architecture of Theories” (the text cited by Smolin): “The one intelligible 
theory of the universe is that of objective idealism, that matter is effete mind, 
inveterate habits becoming physical laws.” (W 8:106). Hence, our task becomes 
“to search out a natural history of laws of nature.”29 (W 8:101).
On Peirce’s approach, irreversible processes are thus far more basic than re-
versible ones, as the latter require a much more regimented environment for a 
reversal to be even possible. We can see that in Peirce’s approach, too, time lies 
at the very origin of the universe –already the appearance of a first cannot be 
undone– while space can only originate at a much later stage, as our notion of 
space encapsulates a high degree of regularity. The latter is true also for matter. 
29 CST makes a comparable move when it shifts its mathematics from geometry to combinatorics. 
Cfr. e.g. Sorkin, (2010).
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Hence, we see the same line of progression in Peirce as the one we encountered in 
the QECST of Smolin and Cortês. Moreover in both approaches, the emergence 
of regularity is associated with a loss of novelty, or spontaneity, in the system. 
To both this loss of novelty is not complete (there remains room for what Peirce 
called “absolute chance”),30 rather “at some stage [it] stops being sufficient to 
destabilize regularity” (Cortês & Smolin, 2015: 19). There are also important 
differences between Peirce and CST. Most significantly, whereas CST seeks to 
show that the universe is ultimately discrete, one finds in Peirce a strong and 
pervasive commitment to continuity.
§7. conclusIon
Though the main project of CST and QECST is to show how space-time 
can be generated from a more basic set of partially related discrete events, Smo-
lin also uses it to formulate a cosmology, including an explanation of the origin 
and nature of natural laws. We saw further that both faced significant challeng-
es interpreting these events and the relations they take to hold between them. 
It is in essence the (a priori) structure of the underlying mathematical model, 
combined with loosely used vague analogies with concepts from macroscopic 
physics, which provides such an interpretation. As a cosmology, especially if we 
assume that QECST fares better than CST in reaching its goals, the theory seems 
to be further hampered by the fact that it has to assume too much to truly answer 
Smolin’s two questions: “Why did the universe start from these initial condi-
tions, rather than different ones?” and “Why is it governed by these laws, rather 
than different ones?” We saw moreover that, at least in its general outline, Peirce’s 
cosmology is close to CST. In fact, I think that the above account sufficiently 
shows that Peirce’s approach to cosmology, with the conceptual framework he 
developed, could be helpful in developing the CST approach further, especially 
if we conceive of it as a cosmological theory. The challenge would be to show 
how something akin to CST can be conceived as a natural product of the pri-
30 The idea that there is absolute chance in the world is Peirce’s doctrine of Tychism (W 8.135). 
The doctrine is argued for in the second Monist article, “The Doctrine of Necessity Examined” (W 
8.111-25).
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mordial state that is still all-too-vaguely described by Peirce –a natural product, 
that is, not a necessary product. We would be looking for an argument that is not 
deductive, and since there is only one universe, not inductive or probabilistic 
either. So we would be looking for an abductive argument, one not unlike how 
Sherlock Holmes solved his puzzles, albeit with the important difference that 
here we must also figure out what the puzzle is and what the pieces look like. 
Such an argument, which would reside within Peirce’s scientific metaphysics, 
would have to take seriously his doctrine of the categories, with all its triadic 
implications (including those for logic), and utilize whatever can be learned from 
both mathematics and physics. The categories, together with a categories-based 
semiotics, could be used to give a conceptually richer account of both the “events” 
that CST speaks of and the relations it conceives between them. Moreover, it 
carries with it the potential of doing so in a manner that prevents all sorts of 
conceptual pollution, including preloading our cosmology with various ontolog-
ical commitments. To give one example, Peirce’s mathematical derivation of the 
categories,31 and his graphical logic of relatives (de Waal, 1996: 41f.), dovetail 
nicely with the Hasse diagrams used by CST, allowing for a leaner interpretation 
of the nodes and relations encountered in those diagrams and how they can be 
taken as representative of events and relations between them.
This may all sound pretty aprioristic, and in a way it is. Doing so, however, 
and taking a minimalist attitude toward our conceptions and presuppositions, 
has the best chance for avoiding that unawares we are smuggling in things we 
take for granted because of our familiarity with how the universe is now, or 
that carry over from long defunct metaphysical or religious views. Moreover, it 
is quite clear that a solidly empirical account can only lead to a very provincial 
cosmology. The result of a Peirce-inspired abductive cosmology would be a plau-
sible, naturalistic account of the universe, one where time is fundamental and 
space an emergent property.
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